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STATEMENT OF ISSOE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The only issue presented in this appeal is whether the 
weight of the evidence supports the Trial Court's conclusion of 
accord and satisfaction. 
STATOTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no statutory or constitutional provisions whose 
interpretation is necessary to determine the accord and 
satisfaction issue. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellant, an overseas employee of Bechtel Civil and 
Minerals, Inc. ("Bechtel"), from May 1981 until January 1983f 
sought to collect S9f126.22 in the Trial Court that he claimed 
Bechtel owed as compensation in the form of "uplifts". (Amended 
Complaint, Record at 36). The "uplifts" were part of a 
compensation package that Bechtel provided to overseas employees 
to insure a certain level of after-tax income. (Morgan 
Affidavit, Record at 66-67). Bechtel adjusted this package 
during the period that appellant was employed and appellant 
claimed he was damaged by the adjustment. (Amended Complaint, 
Record at 36) . 
Bechtel denied appellant's purported injury because his 
after-tax income was not adversely affected by the adjustment. 
Bechtel raised three additional defenses, including: (1) the 
purported contract upon which appellant based his claim 
specifically permitted the adjustment; and (2) the appellant was 
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an employee at will not entitled to make the claim; and, (3) an 
accord and satisfaction barred plaintiff's claim. (Answer, 
Record at 49-52; Bechtelfs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record at 
64-65).
 x 
Bechtel moved for summary judgment on these defenses and 
supported its motion with the deposition of appellant (Record at 
193) and an affidavit of Patrick V. Morgan, Manager of Personnel 
for Bechtel Civil and Minerals (Record at 65). In the hearing on 
the motion both parties agreed no fact disputes would preclude 
the Court from ruling and agreed the evidence then before the 
Court could act as the trial evidence. Based on that 
stipulationf the Trial Court directed that the matter proceed to 
trial on the evidence then in the record. (Record at 112 and 
122) . 
Appellant and Respondent proffered that evidence and 
presented final arguments on the day of the trial. (Record at 
122). The Trial Court reviewed the evidence in detail and issued 
a well-reasoned memorandum decision which held an accord and 
satisfaction barred appellant's claim. (Record at 123-126). The 
evidence upon which the Court based its opinion is set forth in 
its Memorandum Decision and its Findings of Pact. (Record at 
123-226f 174-178). The Decision and the Findings demonstrate 
that Bechtel proposed to alter its compensation package in 
accordance with its compensation policy as a result of a dramatic 
change in the tax laws. Appellant disputed whether Bechtel could 
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change the level of uplifts. As a result of appellant's claims 
Bechtel offered and plaintiff accepted a new compensation package 
which provided substantial benefits to appellant that he would 
not have been entitled to receive under the original compensation 
package. (Record at 153). 
Appellant objected to certain Findings of Fact and moved the 
Court for an Order to amend its Memorandum Decision. (Record at 
170) . The Objections and Motion came on for hearing and the 
Trial Court again heard and fully considered appellant's claim 
that the evidence did not support an accord and satisfaction. 
The Court denied appellant's Objections (Record at 155) and 
Motion (Record at 172 and 173) and entered its Order and 
Judgment, no cause of action (Record at 156). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Appellant has raised two non-issues in an effort to convince 
this Court to depart from the traditional rule that it is the 
Trial Court's perogative to determine the facts and its decision 
will be upheld if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to 
support its version of the facts. Santi v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad, 21 Utah 2d 157f 442 P.2d 921, 923 (1968). 
First, although appellant concedes he agreed to the stipulated 
trial procedure, the appellant now suggests this Court review the 
evidence as the fact finder because of the stipulated procedure. 
Second, appellant suggests he did not have a hearing on the 
Findings of Fact and asks this Court to review those findings. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(Appellantfs Opening Brief 14-16). Neither suggestion has merit. 
Plaintiff stipulated to the procedure and the evidencef which was 
substantial and competent. (Record at 122). Appellant cannot 
claim that procedure was not appropriate at this point and ask 
this Court to substitute its judgment for the Trial Court and 
re-review the facts. Furtherf appellantfs claim that he did not 
have an opportunity to object to the Courtfs Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is plain wrong. The record is clear that 
appellant formally objected and received a full hearing in which 
his Objections to the Decision and Findings of Fact were 
completely considered and rejected. (Record at 0155). 
Further, as shown below, the Trial Court properly rejected 
appellantfs Objections and Motion. The following numbered 
paragraphs indicate the Judgment should be upheld because the 
weight of the evidence amply supports the Court's well-reasoned 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order and Judgment. See Egbert and Jaynes v. R.C. Tolman, 680 
P.2d 746 (Utah 1984). 
1. On or about March 30, 1981f appellant and Bechtel 
entered into an employment relationship. The employment 
conditions at that time, including plaintiffs compensation 
package, were set out in a Recital of International Employment 
Conditions, a tax letter and Employment Conditions - Jubail, 
Saudi Arabia, where plaintiff worked as an auditor from May 1, 
1981 until January 31, 1983. (Findings of Fact, No. 1; Record at 
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175; Bench Depo. at pp. 25-30 Findings of Pactf No. 6; Record at 
176) . 
2. The Recital, Tax Letter and Employment Conditions -
Jubailr Saudi Arabia, indicate Bechtelfs compensation policy for 
overseas employees was designed to provide a certain level of 
after tax take home pay (Morgan Affidavitf Record at 66 and 67). 
3. To reach this goalf the compensation policy originally 
provided for certain uplifts in a base salary. These uplifts 
included a foreign service premium of 7.5% base salary, a special 
area allowance and a "completion incentive" paid annually based 
on a percentage of base salary paid that year. (Memorandum 
Decision, Record at 123; Bench Depo.f pp. 13-15r Record at 194). 
The compensation policy also provided that plaintiff would be 
eligible to receive other benefits only upon completion of 
twenty-four months of employment and on an annual basis 
thereafter. These additional benefits included an incentive 
uplift, accrued vacation, return transportation to the United 
States, shipment of household effects and allowances for 
relocation. (Memorandum Decision, Record at 124; Findings of 
Fact, No. 5, Record at 0175; Bench Depo. at p. 13f Record at 
184; Argument of Appellant's counsel, Record at 31). 
4. In August, 1981f after appellant began to work for 
Bechtelr the United States Congress enacted the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act (ERTA) (H.R. 424, 97th Congress; Public Law 97-34) which 
took effect on January 1, 1982 and altered the tax structure upon 
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1 
which defendants compensation package was based. (Findings of 
Fact, No. 6, Record at 0176; Morgan Affidavit, Record at 67 and 
68) . 
5. Bechtel revised its compensation package in light of the 
v
 Economic Recovery Tax Act and adjusted some uplifts and 
eliminated others. (Findings of Fact, No. 7, Record at 76; 
Morgan Affidavit, Record at 67 and 68). As a result of 
appellantfs and others disputing whether Bechtel could adjust the 
uplifts, the package of changes also included a change in the 
benefits which provided appellant could quit and immediately 
receive the benefits Bechtel formerly agreed to pay only upon 
completion of twenty-four months of employment. (Memorandum 
Decision, Record at 124; Finding of Fact, No. 7, Record at 176; 
Bench Depo., p. 61, Record at 194). Appellant had been in Saudi 
Arabia for seven months at the time the package was offered. 
(Memorandum Decision, Record at 123). 
6. Bechtel informed appellant of the proposed adjustment in 
a meeting with employees prior to the time the adjustments were 
to take effect. (Bench Depo., page 52, Record at 193). Upon the 
request of appellant and others, Bechtel agreed to extend the 
option to quit and receive the benefits upon the completion of 
eighteen months. The plaintiff sought this because at eighteen 
months he would qualify for a $75,000.00 tax exemption allowed 
under the new law to foreign service employees. (Bench Depo., p. 
62, Record at 193). 
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7. Appellant accepted the new package of benefits on or 
about November 10
 f 1982 after serving eighteen months. 
(Memorandum Decisionf Record at 124; Findings of Factf No. 9r 
Record at 176; Bench Depo.f p. 66, Record at 193). Accordingly, 
appellant received the benefits of the adjusted compensation 
policy, including, inter alia, return to point of origin benefits 
Of $2f500.00f a pro rata completion incentive payment of 
$3,986.97f payment for accrued vacation of $1,302.38, cost 
differential of $292.66 and insurance of $155.40. (Findings of 
Factf No. 8r Record at 181; Bench Depo.f pp. 70-77f Record at 
193) . Bechtel had no obligation under the original employment 
conditions or otherwise to pay these benefits to appellant. It 
had offered them under the adjusted benefit package and appellant 
accepted the offer. (Bench Depo.r p. 77f Record at 193). 
8. Appellant made no objection to any changes or reductions 
in his pay at the time he accepted the adjusted benefit package. 
Indeed, in the letter accepting the package the appellant wrote: 
It has been a pleasure working with you in the audit 
group here at Jubail and I would look forward to 
working with you in the future. I appreciate your help 
and consideration in this matter. 
(Memorandum Decision, Record at 123; Findings of Fact, No. 10, 
Record at 182; Bench Depo.f at p. 67f Record at 193). Further, 
at no time during his employment between May 1, 1981, and January 
31, 1983, did plaintiff make a written or oral demand for the 
monies or take any other action to collect the monies he now 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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claims were not paid as a result of the adjustments and changes. 
(Memorandum Decisionf Record at 123; Finding of Factf No. 8f 
Record at 176) . Instead, he continued to work for Bechtel for an 
additional eleven months under the adjusted compensation and 
benefit package. (Memorandum Decision, Record at 123). 
9. At the time appellant terminated his employment he 
executed a sheet which set out the final wages receivedf 
including uplifts, and the additional benefits received. 
Appellant acknowledged receipt of these monies by signing the 
sheet which contained an express statement that plaintifffs final 
check, which included uplifts and the adjusted compensation, was 
to be drawn to the order of Plaintiff "in settlement of net final 
wages11. (Memorandum Decision, Record at 124; Findings of Factf 
No. 11f Record at 177; Bench Depo.f pp. 70-71f Exhibit 15f Record 
at 193). 
10. The benefits in the new adjusted package were in fact 
paid to appellant by a check which expressly stated that it was 
"in settlement of net final wages". (Memorandum Decision, Record 
at 124; Findings of Fact No. 12, Record at 177; Bench Depo.f p. 
73> Exhibit 18, Record at 193). Bechtel tendered this check as 
the last payment under its compensation package with appellant 
and as full settlement of net final wages. (Morgan Affidavit, 
Record at 68) . Appellant knew Bechtel claimed the check was in 
settlement of net final wages. (Appellant's Opening Brief at 
8-9) . Appellant accepted and negotiated it, without comment or 
objection. (Memorandum Decision, Record at 124). 
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11. It was not until appellant had quitf negotiated the 
check and received the substantial benefits provided in the 
adjusted compensation policy that he demanded the monies he now 
claims. (Bench Depo. at 95-96, Record at 193). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts completely and fully support the Trial Court's 
Memorandum Decisionr Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Final Order and Judgment. The evidence shows appellant disputed 
whether Bechtel could change its benefit packagef a point that 
appellant repeats in his brief. Bechtel offered the adjusted 
compensation package to resolve the dispute with appellant and 
others. The adjusted compensation package provided appellant the 
option to quit early and still receive substantial benefits or to 
continue under the modified compensation plan. Appellant would 
not have been entitled to receive the benefits offered until he 
had completed twenty four months in this assignment. Appellant 
accepted the offered early completion benefits without any 
reservation or objection. He negotiated the final paycheck that 
was tendered in settlement of net final wages which included the 
offered benefits. Under the law enunciated by this Court there 
was an accord and satisfaction and appellant's claim is barred. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGDMENT 
The Evidence Substantially Supports the Finding of Accord 
And Satisfaction, 
The evidence substantially supports the finding of the Trial 
Court of an accord and satisfaction. An accord and satisfaction 
as set forth by this Court in Sugarhouse Finance Company v. 
Andersonr 610 P.2d 1369f 1372 (Utah 1980) occurs: 
[wlhere the parties to an agreement resolve that a 
given performance by one party theretof offered in 
substitution of the performance originally agreed upon, 
will discharge the obligation created under the 
original agreement. Essential to its validity aref (1) 
a proper subject matter; (2) competent parties; (3) an 
assent or a meeting of the minds of the parties; and 
(4) a consideration given for the accord. Where the 
underlying claim is disputed or uncertain 
("unliquidated"), the obligors assent to the definite 
statement of performance in the accord amounts to 
sufficient consideration as it constitutes a surrender 
of the right to dispute the initial obligation. Where, 
however, the underlying claim is liquidated and certain 
as to amount, separate consideration must be found to 
support the accord; otherwise the obligor binds himself 
to do nothing he was not already obligated to dof and 
the obligees promise to accept a substitute performance 
is unenforceable. 
There was a proper subject matter in this case. There was a 
compensation package and a dispute arose between appellant and 
Bechtel over it. (Record at 231) . As a result of the dispute, 
Bechtel offered an adjusted compensation package to appellant 
which provided the right to terminate early and receive immediate 
substantial additional benefits that were formerly allowed only 
upon the completion of two years of assignment. Appellant 
accepted this option and received and accepted those benefits 
without reservation or further objection. 
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The evidence clearly shows the parties were competent. The 
plaintiff at the time was a highly paid experienced certified 
public accountant who had worked for Peat, Marwick, and Mitchell 
prior to working for Bechtel. (Bench Depo.f p. 5-15, Record at 
00193) . He had also been a principal and director in an oil 
exploration company. His responsibilities in that position 
included, inter alia, accounting and day-to-day operations for 
the company. Id. Further, despite the implications in 
appellant's brief that Bechtel could take undue advantage of 
appellant by stranding him in Saudi Arabia (Appellant's Opening 
Brief at 11) , there is no evidence of that occurring. Indeed, 
counsel for appellant indicated to the Trial Court there was no 
evidence to suggest that Bechtel ever threatened or represented 
to appellant that appellant had to accept Bechtel's offer or he 
would be stranded in Saudi Arabia. (Record at 220) . Rather, 
both parties were aware of the facts and the matter was "resolved 
in each of their respective best interests". (Plaintiff's Memo, 
in Opposition to Summary Judgment, page 5, Record at 131). 
Further, there is no doubt that there was an offer and 
acceptance of a substitute performance. Appellant has always 
acknowledged that there was an agreed "quid pro quo" between the 
parties. (Plaintiff's Memo, in Opposition to Summary Judgment, 
page 11, Record at 136). The appellant accepted substantial 
benefits as part of this "quid pro quo". 
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The significance of this acceptance is two fold. It makes 
it clear that appellant received the separate consideration 
necessary for an accord and satisfaction of a liquidated sum. 
Sugarhouse Finance Companyf supray at 1372. It also shows there 
was an agreement in which both parties understood all claims were 
x resolved. Appellant signed the sheet at the time of his 
termination which included uplifts and other new benefits in 
reaching a total amount of "net final wages" and which directed 
appellantfs final check be issued "in settlement of net final 
wages". "Wages"f as the Trial Court remarked after doing its own 
researchr includes every form of renumeration payable for a given 
period. The adjusted uplifts and adjusted benefits were in fact 
paid in a check which denominated them as wages and which was in 
settlement of "net final wages'1. Bechtel tendered this check as 
net final wages and appellant knew Bechtel tendered it as net 
final wages. Appellant, without reservationf receivedf acceptedf 
endorsed and cashed the check. 
The evidence, construed on appeal in a light favorable to 
Bechtelf shows the Trial Court properly found there was an accord 
and satisfaction as that term has been defined in previous cases. 
See e.g., Martin Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985) 
(holding a builder's cashing of a check containing the condition 
^
 t that "endorsement hereof constitutes full and final satisfaction" 
was an accord and satisfaction where there was a bona fide 
dispute as to the amount owing even though the builder had struck 
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the conditional endorsement and wrote "not full payment" prior to 
negotiating the check); Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Anderson, 
610 P. 2d 1369 (Utah 1980) (separate consideration supported 
accord and satisfaction where benefits were bestowed upon the 
plaintiff); F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Buildf Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 
404 P.2d 670 (1968). In so finding the Trial Court followed the 
sound policies of this Court and the modern trend adopted by 
others to uphold agreements like the one entered into by 
appellant and Bechtel. Sugarhouse Finance v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 
1369, 1372 (1980) . The law favors compromise and accord and 
satisfaction achieves this goal by upholding these agreements. 
Martin Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985). 
In addition to ignoring this sound policyf appellant's 
position would violate the principle of promissory estoppel, 
which the Court has also invoked in instances like this one: 
We notef in addition [to accord and satisfaction]f that 
this jurisdiction recognizes the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel, whereby an individual who has made a promise 
which the individual should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee . . . 
and which does evidence action or forbearance is 
estopped to deny or repudiate the promise should the 
promisee . . . suffer detriment thereby. Sugarhouse 
Finance v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369f 1373 (1980). 
Bechtel agreed to pay certain sums pursuant to the accord, 
in reliance on appellant accepting the sums in settlement of his 
claims. It tendered the adjusted benefits for that purpose and 
appellant knew it intended them for that purpose and he accepted 
them in resolution of this claim. Appellant is estopped from 
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denying his agreement and asserting this claim for additional 
compensation. 
The cases upon which defendant relies do not relieve the 
appellant from the logical and sound result reached by the Trial 
Court. For instancef appellant cites the case of Messick v. PHD 
Trucking Servicer Inc.f 615 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1980). Reliance is 
misplaced because that case did not involve one transaction like 
this case. In Messick, a plaintiff lessor under a truck leasing 
agreementf brought an action to compel the defendant lessee to 
account for payments due and owing to plaintiff under the lease. 
The facts demonstrated that the plaintiff had purchased the truck 
from two principles of the defendant. The plaintiff then sold 
the truck back to the defendants in a transaction but there was 
"no indication that this transaction was intended to offset any 
amounts owing under the lease agreement11, Id. at 1277. Despite 
this fact, the defendants attempted to bar plaintiff's claims on 
the lease by urging an accord and satisfaction occurred with 
respect to all dealings between the parties. The Court refused 
to permit this because the settlement of one claim does not 
result in the accord and satisfaction of anther claim based on 
"different types of transactions". Id. at 1277-78. A similar 
result was reached in another case upon which appellant relies. 
Bennett v. Robinsonfs Medical Martf Inc.f 18 Utah 2d 186f 417 
P.2d 761 (1966) (distinguished in Martin Remodeling
 f supra, 
because it involved separate claims). 
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These cases are not applicable because there were not two 
claims in dispute in this case. It is clear that an agreement 
was reached based on an adjustment in compensation under which 
Bechtel provided separate consideration to plaintiff. The check 
by which that consideration and uplifts were paid included the 
uplifts as part of "wages" and was in "settlement of net final 
wages". The hand pays sheet that Mr. Bench signed included 
uplifts in reaching a total amount of "net final wages". There 
is no doubt that all considered this one transaction and the 
subsequent agreement to apply to it. 
Appellant also relies on Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 
437 P.2d 202 (Utah 1968) in which the Court denied a claim for 
wages because the plaintiffs had failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence the amounts due.* Hintze does not 
apply to this case either. In Hintze the defendant attempted to 
avoid an obligation to pay commissions of an unliquidated sum by 
sending a check on which it stated "this is the balance of your 
account in full". The Court held that this did not constitute an 
accord and satisfaction because the mere denomination of "a 
balance" upon an account rendered was not sufficient to suggest 
that the check was to be accepted in full satisfaction of the 
pending claim. In this case there is no doubt that both parties 
knew the checks were tendered in full satisfaction of wages. 
* It should be noted that in this case the plaintiff 
offered no direct proof on amounts he claimed were due and 
Bechtel has always alleged that it did not owe any monies to the 
Plaintiff. The Trial Court did not reach these issues because 
E & PRATT *ts decision on accord and satisfaction was dispositive. 
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Alsor contrary to Hintzef there was additional consideration 
offered because a dispute had arisen. Thus, neither Hintze nor 
any of the other cases relied upon apply to these circumstances. 
See, e.g., Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 560 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1977) (at the time checks were negotiated the plaintiffs 
were unaware that a dispute existed); Tates v. Little America 
Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975) (no indication that 
plaintiff knew that the check was being offered in full 
satisfaction of the debt owed). 
CONCLOSION 
The legal conclusion reached by Judge Conder is well 
supported. Bechtel is not liable to plaintiff for any amounts 
claimed due because the acceptance without reservation of the 
offer for the adjusted compensation package and the negotiation 
of the final payment of completion benefits before twenty four 
months of employment constitutes an accord and satisfaction. 
The statements and arguments of plaintiff's brief to the 
contrary are unsupported or erroneous. For instance, plaintiff 
suggests that the terms of his employment required defendant to 
terminate it by giving one monthfs written notice. The facts 
clearly establish that there was no need for one month1s notice 
because the plaintiff, not Bechtel, chose to terminate his 
employment. Similarly, plaintiff suggests that defendant "backed 
off" modifying the purported employment contract by mutual 
agreement. There is no citation to the record for such an 
assertion and the facts are directly contrary. 
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There was a mutual agreement in this case between appellant 
and Bechtel as to the adjusted compensation package. Appellant 
received substantial benefits under the adjusted compensation 
package pursuant to the agreement. Neither the lawf equity or 
good conscience will allow appellant to receive those benefits 
and pursue his claim. The Trial Courtfs opinion should be 
upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of Decemberf 1986. 
CLYDE & PRATT 
ieven E. Clyde 
James L. Warlaumont 
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I do hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
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